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ABSTRACT
Many households devote a large fraction of their budgets to "consumption commitments" -- goods
that involve transaction costs and are infrequently adjusted. This paper characterizes risk preferences
in an expected utility model with commitments. We show that commitments affect risk preferences
in two ways: (1) they amplify risk aversion with respect to moderate-stake shocks and (2) they create
a motive to take large-payoff gambles. The model thus helps resolve two basic puzzles in expected
utility theory: the discrepancy between moderate-stake and large-stake risk aversion and lottery
playing by insurance buyers. We discuss applications of the model such as the optimal design of
social insurance and tax policies, added worker effects in labor supply, and portfolio choice. Using
event studies of unemployment shocks, we document evidence consistent with the consumption
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szeidl@econ.berkeley.eduMany households have ￿consumption commitments￿that are costly to adjust when shocks such
as job loss or illness occur. For example, most homeowners do not move during unemployment
spells, and have a commitment to make mortgage payments. Consumption of many other durable
goods (vehicles, furniture) and services (insurance, utilities) may also be di¢ cult to adjust. Data
on household consumption behavior show that more than 50 percent of the average household￿ s
budget is ￿xed over moderate income shocks (see section I).
This paper argues that incorporating consumption commitments into the analysis of risk pref-
erences can help explain several stylized facts and yields a set of new normative implications. The
canonical expected utility model of risk preferences does not allow for commitments because it
assumes that agents consume a single composite commodity. This assumption requires that agents
can substitute freely among goods at all times. When some goods cannot be costlessly adjusted, a
composite commodity does not exist, and the standard expected utility model cannot be applied.
We analyze the e⁄ect of commitments on risk preferences in a model where agents consume two
goods ￿one that requires payment of a transaction cost to change consumption (housing), and one
that is freely adjustable at all times (food). Agents face wealth shocks after making a housing
commitment. Under weak conditions, agents follow an (S,s) policy over housing: they move only
if there is a large unexpected change in wealth. We focus on characterizing the value function
over wealth for agents with a commitment, v(W), which determines the welfare cost of shocks and
risk preferences. In the conventional model without adjustment costs, v(W) is a concave function.
The introduction of commitments a⁄ects the shape of v(W) relative to this benchmark in two ways.
First, commitments amplify risk aversion over small and moderate risks. Within the (S,s) band,
the curvature of v(W) is greater than it would be if housing were freely adjustable. Intuitively,
for small or temporary shocks that do not induce moves, households are forced to concentrate all
reductions (or increases) in wealth on changes in food consumption. For example, if an agent must
reduce total expenditure by 10 percent and has pre-committed half of his income, he is forced to
reduce spending on discretionary items by 20 percent. This concentrated reduction in consumption
of adjustable goods raises the curvature of v(W) within the (S,s) band. For a shock su¢ ciently
large to warrant moving, additional reductions in wealth are accommodated by cutting both food
and housing, restoring the curvature of v(W) to its lower no-commitment level outside the (S,s)
band.
Second, commitments generate a motive to take certain gambles. The gambling motive arises
1from non-concavities in v(W) at the edges of the (S,s) band: the marginal utility of wealth at S￿"
is lower than the marginal utility of wealth at S +". As a result, committed agents may take bets
that have large, move-inducing payo⁄s. Intuitively, an agent who earns an extra dollar can spend
it only on food; but buying a lottery ticket gives him an opportunity to buy a better house or car,
which can have higher expected utility than another dollar of food.
By changing v(W) in these two ways, commitments can help resolve two basic puzzles that arise
in expected utility theory. The ￿rst is that plausible degrees of risk aversion over small or moderate
stakes imply implausibly high risk aversion over large-stake risks in the one-good expected utility
model [Hansson 1988, Kandel and Stambaugh 1991, Rabin 2000]. Commitments can potentially
resolve this paradox because two distinct parameters control risk preferences over small and large
risks. The second puzzle is the question of why individuals simultaneously buy insurance and
lottery tickets. Friedman and Savage [1948] and Hartley and Farrell [2002] propose that non-
concave utility over wealth can explain this behavior. Commitments provide microfoundations for
such a non-concave utility over wealth and thus can help explain why agents repeatedly take some
skewed gambles. The non-concave utility induced by commitments addresses many of Markowitz￿ s
[1952] criticisms of the Friedman and Savage utility speci￿cation because commitments create a
reference point that makes the non-concavities shift with wealth levels.
Since commitments change preferences over wealth, which are a primitive in many economic
problems, the model has a broad range of applications. We develop three applications in some
detail in this paper, and describe several others qualitatively. In the ￿rst application, we evaluate
the quantitative relevance of commitments for choice under uncertainty by performing calibrations
similar to those of Rabin [2000]. We ￿nd that the model can generate substantial risk aversion over
￿moderate stake￿gambles ￿risks that involve stakes of roughly $1,000 to $10,000 ￿while retaining
plausible risk preferences over large gambles. Hence, commitments can explain high degrees of
risk aversion in a lifecycle consumption-savings setting with respect to risks such as unemployment
or health shocks. However, the model cannot explain risk aversion with respect to small gambles
such as $100 stakes (as documented, e.g., by Cicchetti and Dubin [1994]), because utility remains
locally linear.1
The second application explores the normative implications of the model for social insurance
1Such ￿rst-order risk aversion can be explained by a kink in the utility function, as in models of loss aversion (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] and Koszegi and Rabin [2005]). The commitments model is not inconsistent with
loss aversion, and quantifying the relative contribution of the two models over various stakes would be an interesting
direction for future research.
2policies. When agents have commitments, the marginal value of insurance can be larger for
small (or temporary) shocks than large (or permanent) shocks. As a result, the optimal wage
replacement rate for shocks such as unemployment may be higher than for larger shocks such as
long-term disability. The mechanism underlying this result is that agents abandon commitments
when large shocks occur, mitigating their welfare cost. We document evidence consistent with this
mechanism by comparing households￿consumption responses to small versus large shocks using
panel data. Following ￿small￿unemployment shocks (wage income loss in year of unemployment
between 0 and 33 percent), many households leave housing ￿xed while cutting food consumption
signi￿cantly. However, households are more likely to reoptimize on both food and housing in
response to ￿large￿ shocks (wage loss greater than 33 percent). Coupled with the consumption
adjustment patterns documented in Section I, these ￿ndings show that households deviate from
ideal unconstrained consumption plans for moderate-scale shocks, supporting the basic channel
through which commitments a⁄ect risk preferences.
In the third application, we illustrate implications of the model in an area that does not involve
uncertainty. We introduce an endogenous labor supply decision and show that commitments make
the wealth elasticity of labor supply larger in the short run relative to the long run. Commitments
can therefore help explain the ￿added worker e⁄ect￿in labor economics, as well as the small short-
run labor supply responses to taxation estimated in the public ￿nance literature.
Our model is related to several papers in the literature on consumption and durable goods,
starting with the seminal work of Grossman and Laroque [1990], who analyze consumption and
asset pricing in a model with a single durable good. Our analysis builds on and contributes to
this literature in two ways. First, because Grossman and Laroque study a continuous time model
with a smooth di⁄usion process for wealth, they do not explore how risk preferences vary with
the size of the gamble as we do here. Second, by introducing an adjustable good, we show
that commitments a⁄ect risk preferences by changing the sensitivity of adjustable consumption to
shocks, an observation that is useful in calibrating the model and using it in applications.
Our analysis is also related to other recent studies that have explored two-good adjustment cost
models. Flavin and Nakagawa [2003] analyze asset pricing in a two-good adjustment cost model,
and ￿nd that it ￿ts consumption data better than neoclassical models. Fratantoni [2001], Li [2003],
Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Silverman [2004], Shore and Sinai [2005], and Gollier [2005] explore
other implications of commitments models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents motivating
3evidence for the model by examining how consumption adjustment patterns vary across goods.
Section II develops the model and characterizes risk preferences. Section III presents applications,
and Section IV concludes. All proofs are given in the appendix.
I. MOTIVATING EVIDENCE
We begin by documenting some facts about consumption adjustment patterns at the household
level to motivate the model developed below. Table I shows expenditure shares for broad con-
sumption categories such as housing and food using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Our goal is to classify each of these categories as ￿commitment￿or ￿adjustable,￿in order to esti-
mate the share of consumption that is ￿xed over moderate-scale shocks. This estimate is useful in
calibrating the model and gauging the extent to which commitments amplify risk aversion.2
I.A. Frequency Classi￿cation
A simple classi￿cation method is to de￿ne categories whose consumption is infrequently reduced
as commitments. Let gcit denote the growth rate of consumption of category c by household
i from year t ￿ 1 to year t. Figure I plots histograms for the distribution of gcit for several
consumption categories. We use food and housing data from the PSID (1968-1997), following the
conventions established by Zeldes [1989] and Gruber [1997] in de￿ning these variables. The data
for the remaining categories is from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (1990-1999). See the data
appendix for details on the data construction and de￿nitions.3
For nondurable goods and services, gcit can be computed simply as the log change in reported
expenditures from one year to the next. Figures 1a-1c show the resulting histograms for changes
in nominal expenditure on food, entertainment, and health insurance. Measuring changes in
consumption of housing and other durable goods requires a di⁄erent approach because the data do
not give measures of the ￿ ow consumption value of these goods. For housing, we ￿rst determine
whether a household moved from year t￿1 to year t. If it did not, we de￿ne the change in housing
consumption as zero. For households that did move, we de￿ne the change in housing consumption
2Calibrating the model requires a measure of the ￿ ow consumption share of commitments rather than the expendi-
ture shares reported in Table 1. While data on ￿ ow consumption is unavailable for durables, aggregate expenditure
shares in a representative sample are approximately equal to average consumption shares in a steady state economy
with constant growth, depreciation, and interest rate. This fact allows us to interpret the shares in Table 1 as average
consumption shares.
3We use housing data from the PSID because the CEX drops movers. We use food data from the PSID for
consistency with the event-study analysis below (results from the CEX data are similar). Since the PSID gives data
on only food and housing consumption, we use CEX data to classify the remaining categories.
4as the log change in nominal rent for renters and the log change in the nominal market value of
the houses for homeowners.4,5 We use an analogous approach in the CEX to de￿ne changes in car
consumption (see data appendix for details).
For other durable goods, namely apparel and furniture/appliances, we do not have a measure
of initial value of the durable stock in the data. For these categories, we analyze the level change
in consumption instead of growth rate of consumption. We de￿ne the level change in consumption
as net expenditures (purchases minus sales) over a one year period in real 2000 dollars. Note that
households can actively reduce their consumption of these durables (beyond natural decline due to
depreciation) only by selling these durables in the secondary market, i.e. by having negative net
expenditures. Figure If shows the distribution of level changes in furniture consumption using this
methodology.
Figure I indicates that food and entertainment are easily adjustable goods since their distribu-
tions are quite dispersed. In contrast, housing is infrequently adjusted, consistent with the large
transaction costs inherent in changing housing consumption (e.g., broker fees, monetary and utility
costs of moving). Similarly, consumption of durable goods such as cars and furniture is infrequently
adjusted, particularly downward, perhaps because market resale values are signi￿cantly lower than
actual values, creating an adjustment cost. Finally, the histogram for health insurance indicates
that commitments extend beyond durables to services that involve contracts and penalties for early
termination.6
Figure I suggests a natural statistic for classifying categories into the ￿commitment￿and ￿ad-
justable￿ bins ￿the fraction of households that report an active reduction in consumption. A
category whose consumption is di¢ cult to cut is more of a commitment. Table I reports this
statistic for the consumption categories in the CEX, following the methodology illustrated in the
histograms. Using a cuto⁄ of 33 percent on the frequency of downward adjustments, the ￿rst ￿ve
consumption categories fall into the ￿commitment￿category, implying that commitments comprise
approximately 50 percent of the average household￿ s budget.
4We use this methodology because ￿ uctuations in rents or housing values due to asset price variation do not
correspond to changes in housing consumption for non-movers. While this method misses changes in housing
consumption among non-movers due to remodelling, reductions in housing consumption through remodelling are
presumably infrequent.
5For simplicity, we do not compute housing consumption growth rates for individuals who switch from owning to
renting or vice versa (5.5 percent of observations). Since omitting these observations understates the frequency of
moves, we adjust the fraction of zeros in the histogram (Figure 1b) to correct for this bias. See the data appendix
for details.
6Late payments do not eliminate commitments. In the event of an income shock, the individual must still eventually
pay the bill. The ability to make late payments is simply an additional credit channel.
5I.B. Wealth Shock Classi￿cation
A limitation of the frequency classi￿cation method is that it does not shed light on how con-
sumption is adjusted in response to shocks. Examining the response of consumption to wealth
shocks is important because the key concept underlying our model is that some portions of the
household￿ s consumption bundle remain ￿xed when moderate shocks occur.
To provide such evidence, we conduct an event study analysis of unemployment shocks using
data from the PSID spanning 1968 to 2003. In particular, we compare the food and housing
consumption responses of homeowners and renters to examine whether higher adjustment costs for
housing lead to less adjustment on that margin. We focus on heads of household between the
ages of 20 and 65 who report one unemployment spell during the panel. We construct event-study
graphs by normalizing the year of unemployment as 0 for all individuals, and de￿ning all other
years relative to this base year (e.g., the year before the shock is -1, the year after the shock is
+1). Observations with changes in the number of people in the household are excluded to avoid
introducing noise in the consumption measures because of changes in household composition.
Figure IIa plots mean real annual growth rates of food and housing consumption, de￿ned as
above, for individuals who rented in year -1.7 In the year of job loss, food consumption falls from
its pre-unemployment level by 6.7 percent, while housing consumption falls by 4.3 percent. The
fraction of renters who move rises from 39.4 percent in year -1 to 45.3 percent in year 0. Renters
who do not move reduce food consumption by 5.7 percent on average, indicating that many renters
reduce food but not housing consumption in response to the shock. Figure IIb shows analogous
￿gures for individuals who were homeowners in year -1. Homeowners reduce food consumption by
9.1 percent in year 0, but reduce housing consumption by less than 0.1 percent on average. The
fraction of homeowners who move rises from 12.8 percent in year -1 to only 14.2 percent in year 0,
indicating that homeowners￿consumption bundles become more distorted in terms of food-housing
composition than renters￿bundles during unemployment spells.8 These ￿ndings support the claim
that adjustment costs induce households to concentrate expenditure reductions on certain goods
when moderate income shocks occur.
The event studies suggest a second, more general de￿nition of ￿commitments￿￿categories that
7These ￿gures omit individuals who switch from owning to renting or vice versa. In Appendix C, we show that
including these switchers by computing the rental value of owning a house using Himmelberg et. al.￿ s [2005] user cost
of housing series does not a⁄ect the results. Appendix C also gives summary statistics showing how homeowners and
renters in the PSID sample di⁄er on observables, and shows that the event-study results are robust to controlling for
these observables and several other speci￿cation checks.
8Note that the magnitude of the food consumption drop is not much larger for homeowners than renters. This is
presumably because homeowners are wealthier on average, and can therefore better smooth the shock intertemporally.
6are insensitive to moderate income shocks. Unfortunately, since the PSID contains data on only
food and housing, the e⁄ect of unemployment shocks on consumption of other goods cannot be
estimated. However, we expect that more goods would be classi￿ed as commitments under this
wealth-shock de￿nition than under the frequency of adjustment de￿nition used above. For example,
while utility bills ￿ uctuate over time as temperatures and energy costs change, it may be di¢ cult
to voluntarily change heating expenditures sharply in response to a shock if one does not move.
Similarly, consumption of education and gasoline for vehicles may also be relatively unresponsive
to moderate shocks despite being volatile over time because of variation in input costs, lifecycle
patterns, etc. While utilities, fuel costs, and education do not involve explicit adjustment costs,
they have a commitment-like property in that they may be di¢ cult to adjust and force additional
adjustment on other margins. Hence, in our stylized two-good model, these categories a⁄ect risk
aversion in the same way as housing and other goods with adjustment costs. Including these goods
as ￿commitments￿suggests an e⁄ective commitment share closer to 65 percent.
Irrespective of the details of the method used to de￿ne commitments, the key point is that a
substantial portion of consumption is in￿ exible. The next section explores the implications of this
observation for risk preferences.
II. THEORY
II.A. Setup
Consider a household that lives for T periods and consumes two goods: adjustables, such as food
(f), and commitments, such as housing (x). Adjusting commitment consumption that provides x
units of services per period requires payment of an adjustment cost k ￿ x, where k > 0. The





where period utility u(f;x) is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave, and three
times continuously di⁄erentiable. For simplicity, we assume that the household does not discount
future utility and that the interest rate is zero.
The household has a risky income stream denoted by yt. Let Wt denote wealth at the beginning
of period t. The change in wealth, Wt+1 ￿ Wt, is determined by income minus expenditure on
7current food and housing consumption, less moving costs kxt￿1 in the event that the household
decides to move.9 The household￿ s dynamic budget constraint is
(1) Wt+1 = Wt + yt+1 ￿ ft ￿ xt ￿ kxt￿1 ￿ 1fxt￿1 6= xtg for 1 ￿ t ￿ T
together with the terminal condition WT+1 = 0. The timing of the household￿ s problem is as
follows. In period zero, the household selects a house x0 to maximize expected utility given initial
wealth W0 and its knowledge of the distribution of the future path of income. The household begins
consuming f and x in period 1, which it enters with wealth W1 = W0 + y1 and commitment x0.
In period 1 and all subsequent periods, consumption of ft and xt is chosen to maximize expected
utility, taking into account the cost of adjusting prior commitments.
Note when choosing x0 in period 0, the household is aware of the commitment nature of the
good and takes into account its e⁄ects on the welfare cost of shocks in subsequent periods. We focus
here on characterizing consumption behavior and risk preferences in period 1, after the commitment
choice has been made. From the perspective of period 1, x0 is a state variable that is e⁄ectively
treated as exogenous by the household. In this paper, we do not characterize the optimal policy
for x0. Shore and Sinai [2005] explore this decision, and show that an increase in risk can either
increase or reduce x0, depending on the distribution of the risk.
We make two assumptions to simplify the analysis of the household￿ s problem. First, we abstract
from capital market imperfections by allowing the household to borrow against future income.
Second, we assume that all uncertainty in the economy is resolved in period 1: in particular, the
household learns the entire realization of fytgT
t=1 at the beginning of period 1. We discuss the
implications of relaxing these assumptions below.
II.B. Consumption Behavior
The optimal consumption policy in period 1 is governed by two state variables: prior commit-
ments x0 and lifetime wealth W = W0 +
PT
t=1 yt. Since the discount factor and interest rate are
zero, and all uncertainty is resolved in period 1, the optimal consumption path is deterministic and
￿ at: ft = f1 and xt = x1 for all t = 1;2;:::;T. As a result, if the household ever moves, it moves in
period 1.
The decision to move in period 1 depends on a trade-o⁄ between the bene￿t of having the
9While the consumption adjustment patterns documented above suggest that adjustment costs are larger for
reductions than increases, we assume a symmetric adjustment cost for simplicity. Permitting asymmetric adjustment
costs would not a⁄ect the main qualitative results.
8optimal bundle of food and housing consumption and the transaction cost associated with reaching
that bundle. To characterize this decision formally, let vc(W;x0) denote the household￿ s value
function in period 1. Then




where v0(W;x0) is maximized utility conditional on never moving, and vm(W;x0) is the maximized
utility of a household who moves in period 1. The optimal consumption choice of the household
has a simple analytical solution if the utility function satis￿es the following conditions.
A1 Limit properties of utility: limf!1 u1(f;x) = limx!1 u2(f;x) = 0; and limf!0 u(f;x) =
inff0;x0 u(f0;x0) for all x.
A2 The marginal utility of food is nondecreasing in housing consumption: u1;2(f;x) ￿ 0.
Both of these conditions are satis￿ed for a wide class of utility functions, including (1) the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) speci￿cation when the elasticity of substitution is not
greater than 1; and (2) separable power utility over the two goods as long as the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion for food is 1 or higher. Under these conditions, the agent￿ s consumption
policy in period 1 can be written as an (S,s) rule:
Lemma 1. Under assumptions A1 and A2, for each x0 > 0 there exist s < S such that
(i) when W 2 (s;S), the optimal policy is not to move:
xt = x0 and ft = W=T ￿ x0:
(ii) when W = 2 (s;S), the optimal policy is to move, and
(ft;xt) = argmaxfu(f;x) j f + x = (W ￿ kx0)=Tg:
(iii) when k increases, s falls and S increases.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. Suppose that the agent experiences
a large negative wealth shock in period 1. Then he will be forced to reduce food consumption
drastically in order to maintain the housing commitment that he previously made. Since such a
sharp reduction in food consumption causes a large reduction in utility, it becomes optimal to pay
9the adjustment cost and move into a smaller home. Conversely, if wealth rises sharply, rather than
allocating all of the extra wealth to food, whose marginal utility eventually diminishes to zero, it
is preferable to pay the adjustment cost and upgrade to a large house. For smaller shocks, the
utility gain from fully reoptimizing the consumption bundle is insu¢ cient to o⁄set the transaction
cost, so there is an (S,s) band where the agent does not move.
Assumptions A1 and A2 are useful in obtaining the (S,s) result because they guarantee that
the agent moves for large shocks. A1 ensures that it is preferable to move to a smaller house than
to cut food consumption to zero. To understand the role of A2, consider the case where f and x
are perfect substitutes. In that case, A2 is violated, and the household would never move, because
housing and food are interchangeable. Note that these assumptions are su¢ cient but not necessary
conditions for Lemma 1 and subsequent results. Empirical evidence shows that households follow
(S,s) policies for goods that involve adjustment costs [Eberly 1994, Attanasio 2000, Martin 2003],
suggesting that violations of assumptions A1 or A2, if any, are not large enough to cause deviations
from the intuitive (S,s) policy in practice.
II.C. Risk Preferences
The welfare cost of shocks, and thus the household￿ s risk preferences, are determined by the
shape of the value function vc(W;x0) in period 1. We formally characterize this function in a
series of steps. Before proceeding, it is helpful to introduce some notation. Let vn (W) denote the
value function of a hypothetical agent who pays no adjustment costs for housing, and let ￿n(W) =
￿vn
WWW=vn
W represent the period 1 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) over wealth for









as the elasticity of u1(f;x) with respect to x. Note that both ￿f and "uf;x are pure preference
parameters: they depend on the level of f and x only, and not on the presence or absence of
adjustment costs.
10Throughout, we use the convention that a superscript c refers to the presence of adjustment costs while a
superscript n refers to the case of no adjustment costs.
10Let fn(W) and xn(W) represent the optimal consumption choices in period 1 as a function of
lifetime wealth W for a consumer who faces no adjustment costs. Let "n
f;W denote the elasticity
of food consumption with respect to wealth W in period 1 for this consumer and "c
f;W the corre-




E⁄ect of commitments on CRRA. The CRRA over wealth in the benchmark case of a consumer
















The intuition for this expression is as follows. By the envelope theorem, marginal utility over wealth
(vW) equals the marginal utility of food (u1) at the optimum. Hence the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion, de￿ned as the elasticity of vn
W with respect to W, also equals the elasticity of u1 with
respect to W. The marginal utility of food itself changes with W for two reasons, which correspond
to the two terms in (3): ￿rst, because increased food consumption reduces u1 and second, because
increased housing consumption a⁄ects u1 through complementarity between the two goods.
For a consumer with adjustment costs, a similar calculation gives
(4) ￿c(W;x0) = ￿f"c
f;W
as long as W 2 (s;S). Note that "x;w does not appear in (4) because within the (S;s) band,
housing does not change with W.
In general, the terms in (3) and (4) are not directly comparable, because ￿f is evaluated at
di⁄erent values of (f;x) in the two cases. However, at the wealth level W implicitly de￿ned by
xn(W) = x0, the optimal choice of x and f is the same with and without adjustment costs.11 At this
wealth level, we can compute an exact value for the change in risk aversion due to commitments:








Equation (5) captures the key intuition of our model. It shows that commitments magnify risk
11Such a W exists because A2 ensures that x
n(W) is increasing [Chipman 1977], x
n(W) is continuous, x
n(0) = 0,
and by A1 x
n(W) ! 1 as W ! 1.
11aversion for two reasons, corresponding to the two non-negative terms on the right hand side.
The ￿rst term arises from the fact that wealth shocks are borne solely on the food margin when
housing consumption is ￿xed. This makes the elasticity of food consumption with respect to wealth
larger in the case with commitments. Consequently, the marginal utility of food, and hence the
marginal utility of wealth, rises more quickly as wealth falls when the agent has commitments. More
concretely, consider an individual who loses his job and cuts back sharply on food or entertainment
expenditures to pay the mortgage and other bills. The welfare cost of unemployment is larger for
this individual because he cannot reduce commitment consumption easily, forcing him to make
larger reductions on adjustable goods.
The second term in (5) shows that commitments magnify risk aversion further in the presence
of complementarity (u12 > 0). Without adjustment costs, the optimal response to a reduction in
wealth is to reduce both x and f. When u12 > 0, the reduction in x reduces the marginal utility
of f, cushioning the e⁄ect of the cut in f on marginal utility. When x cannot be adjusted, this
cushioning e⁄ect is shut down, and a given drop in f has a larger impact on marginal utility. More
concretely, suppose the adjustable and commitment goods are electricity and housing. A given
reduction in electricity (used for heating) has a larger cost in terms of marginal utility when the
agent cannot simultaneously reduce housing consumption, magnifying risk aversion.
A special case. The following speci￿cation of utility yields a simple expression that is useful in








From (3), the ratio of curvatures over wealth with and without adjustment costs at W is
(7)
￿c






Equation (7) shows that the commitment share of the budget is a key factor in determining how
much commitments magnify risk aversion over small shocks. When commitments constitute a
higher share of expenditures, shocks are concentrated on a smaller set of goods, and risk aversion
is higher. When ￿f > ￿x, the consumer is particularly risk averse over adjustable goods, increasing
the ampli￿cation e⁄ect.
Curvature of the value function. The ampli￿ed risk aversion result in (5), which was derived
for wealth level W, can be extended to all wealth levels in the (S,s) band by imposing restrictions
12on how the curvature of u(f;x) varies over a range of consumption bundles. In particular, we
assume that the utility function satis￿es one of the following conditions.
A3 u(f;x) is homogenous of some degree 1 ￿ ￿.
A4 u(f;x) is separable, ￿f is constant and supx ￿x(x) < ￿f.
These assumptions allow for most common speci￿cations of preferences over two goods, includ-
ing CES utility and separable power utility (6) as long as ￿f ￿ ￿x. The following proposition
characterizes the curvature of v(W;x0) at all wealth levels.
Proposition 1. Assume that A1 and A2 hold. Then,
(i) when either A3 or A4 holds, commitments magnify risk aversion in the (S,s) band: ￿c(W;x0) >
￿n(W) for all W 2 (s;S).
(ii) when either A3 or A4 holds, risk aversion is higher inside the (s;S) band than outside:
￿c(W) > ￿c(W0) for all W 2 (s;S) and W0 = 2 (s;S) such that W0 > kS=T.
(iii) agents have a gambling motive: vc(W;x0) is locally convex at W = s and W = S, and
hence there exist wealth levels W and random variables e Z with Ee Z = 0 such that
Evc(W + e Z;x0) > vc(W;x0).
The results of this proposition are illustrated in Figure Ia, which plots the value functions
vc(W;x0) and vn(W). Part (i) extends the result in (5) by establishing that commitments increase
the curvature of the value function at all W 2 (s;S). Part (ii) of the proposition shows that a
consumer with commitments is more risk averse inside the (S,s) band than outside. This result
follows closely from (i), because outside the (S,s) band the consumer has abandoned prior com-
mitments and thus has preferences similar to those of a consumer who faces no adjustment costs.
One di⁄erence between the two consumers is that the one who abandoned prior commitments has
e⁄ective wealth reduced by the transaction cost kx0 relative to the consumer with no adjustment
costs. At small wealth levels, this reduction in wealth can signi￿cantly increase the CRRA. Hence,
(ii) holds only at wealth levels that are not too small relative to the transaction cost of moving,
explaining the condition W0 > kS=T.
Part (iii) shows that commitments create an incentive to take certain zero expected-value gam-
bles in period 1. The gambling motive arises because the value function is locally convex at s
13and S: as shown in Figure Ia, the one-sided derivatives of vc satisfy vc
1(W￿;x0) < vc
1(W+;x0) at
W = s and W = S. Since the value function is strictly concave within the (S,s) band, fair gambles
that have payo⁄s within the (S,s) band are always rejected. Agents only pursue gambles which
have payo⁄s that would make it optimal to drop prior commitments. To see why such gambles can
be attractive, consider an individual who is deciding whether to buy a candy bar that costs $1 or a
fair lottery ticket for $1 that will pay $1 million if he wins. A one good (no commitments) model
assumes that the agent will buy one million candy bars if he wins the lottery (or one million units
of the composite commodity). In this case, buying the lottery ticket is not optimal because the
marginal utility of candy is diminishing, and the agent would be better o⁄ getting one candy bar
with certainty. However, with commitments, the agent will buy more than just candy if he wins
the lottery. While the $1 in hand cannot be spent to buy a better house or car, the $1 million can.
Consequently, the expected utility of the skewed lottery may exceed the utility of the candy bar.
Borrowing constraints and persistent uncertainty. We now explore the implications of relaxing
the two main assumptions made above. First consider the e⁄ect of borrowing constraints. Suppose
that the consumer has access to a savings technology but can never borrow. To simplify further,
assume that the income pro￿le is ￿ at starting in period 2, i.e., y2 = y3 = ::: = yT = y. This implies
that the borrowing constraint will not bind in periods 2 through T; however, it may bind in period
1 if the realization of y1 is low enough.
Figure Ib illustrates the e⁄ect of the borrowing constraint on v(W;x0). For high realizations
of y1, the borrowing constraint has no e⁄ect on the value function, because the consumer does not
want to borrow. However, once y1 is low enough, wealth falls below the point WBC at which the
constraint starts to bind. At this point, the inability to borrow forces the consumer to concentrate
additional reductions in expenditure solely on period 1 food consumption, instead of splitting the
reduction over T periods. This argument suggests that for wealth realizations W < WBC, the
di⁄erence in risk aversion between the commitment and no-commitment cases (￿c￿￿n) is increased
by a factor of at least T when the consumer does not move.12 In the appendix, we establish this
result formally under some regularity conditions on u(f;x).
To see more concretely why commitments have a larger e⁄ect on risk aversion when agents are
borrowing constrained, consider the example of a short unemployment spell. Individuals without
12The optimal moving policy with borrowing constraints is more complex when W < W
BC than in the basic model.
Following a large negative shock in period 1, the consumer may decide to move into a small house permanently, or to
set a small x1 for one period only, and then move again in period 2. In the interest of space, we do not characterize
the dynamics of commitment consumption with borrowing constraints in more detail here.
14borrowing constraints can smooth the income loss from this shock over several years. Hence,
their risk aversion with respect to such a temporary shock is small regardless of whether they have
commitments or not. In contrast, individuals who cannot borrow are forced to cut expenditure
sharply while unemployed. This makes the potential welfare gain from relaxing commitments much
greater for them.
We now brie￿ y discuss what happens when the consumer faces additional uncertainty in future
periods. In this case, (3) and (4) remain valid expressions for the CRRA (without borrowing con-
straints). However, the key elasticity "c
f;W responsible for magni￿ed risk aversion may be reduced.
This is because future risk provides additional margins, namely future commitment consumption,
that the consumer can adjust in response to a shock. For example, suppose there is a high probabil-
ity of a move-inducing shock in period 2. In this case, commitments have a smaller impact on risk
aversion in period 1, because future commitment consumption is e⁄ectively adjustable, and only
current commitment consumption is not adjusted in response to the shock. While the commitment
e⁄ect may be mitigated to some extent with future uncertainty, the option of future adjustment
becomes less relevant with borrowing constraints, and risk aversion could still be substantially
ampli￿ed.
II.D. Welfare Costs of Non-negligible Risks
Our analysis thus far has focused on characterizing the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, which
measures preferences over in￿nitesimal risks. Since most risks of interest are not in￿nitesimal in
practice, we now analyze the e⁄ect of commitments on preferences over non-negligible risks.
To model non-negligible risks, let f W denote a random variable which represents the realization
of lifetime wealth in period 1. Assume that f W > kS=T with probability one and that f W has
a ￿nite expected value Ef W. Let WCE(f W;x0;k) denote the certainty equivalent, de￿ned such
that an agent with adjustment cost k and prior commitment x0 is indi⁄erent between f W and a
sure payment of WCE(f W;x0;k) at the beginning of period 1. The welfare cost of the risk f W
can be measured by the proportional risk premium ￿(f W;x0;k), which is de￿ned by the equation
Ef W ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿(f W;x0;k)
￿
= WCE(f W;x0;k).
To compare risk aversion over gambles of di⁄erent sizes, we introduce the concept of ￿equivalent
relative risk aversion.￿Consider a gamble f W for which a consumer with commitments has certainty
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15indi⁄erent between f W and a sure payment of WCE. This de￿nition implies that for gambles
similar to f W, the agent with commitments has essentially the same risk preferences as one with no





relative risk aversion can be thought of as an approximate measure of the risk premium per unit
of risk:
(8) ￿(f W;x0;k) ￿ 2
￿log
￿




For small risks, the validity of (8) follows from the Arrow-Pratt approximation (Arrow 1965, Pratt
1964). For large gambles, (8) is an approximation, which is exact for the class of lognormally
distributed risks.
To study the e⁄ect of commitments on the welfare costs of moderate vs. large-stake risks, we
characterize how equivalent relative risk aversion varies over a sequence of risks of increasing size.
First, de￿ne f W to be a ￿moderate risk￿with respect to k and x0 if WCE(f W;x0;k) 2 (s;S). That
is, f W is a moderate risk if its certainty equivalent does not induce the household to move.14 Now
consider a sequence of risks f W￿ with a common expected value Ef W, indexed by their standard
deviation ￿ ￿ 0.15 We label this a sequence of increasing risks with respect to x0 and k if (1)
lim￿!1Prob[W￿ 2 (s;S)] = 0 so that for ￿ large, the risks assign close to full probability to the




< s so that for ￿ large the risks
are not moderate in the sense de￿ned above; and (3) as ￿ ! 0, the third absolute central moment
of f W￿ is of smaller order than ￿2. The last condition [Pratt 1964] ensures that for ￿ small, the
tails of the distribution do not dominate the distribution￿ s shape. This condition holds for most
commonly used families of distributions, including the normal, the lognormal, the exponential and
the uniform.
Proposition 2. Assume that A1 and A2 hold.
(i) Adjustment costs magnify moderate-stake risk aversion: For any moderate risk f W with
respect to k1 and x0, and any k2 > k1, ￿(f W;x0;k1) ￿ ￿(f W;x0;k2).
13When W





appendix shows that equivalent relative risk aversion is well-de￿ned for all risks considered here.
14Note that whether a shock of given size is ￿moderate￿depends on the consumer￿ s expected location in the (S,s)
band. If the consumer is very close to the edge, even small shocks may fail to qualify as ￿moderate￿as they may
induce moves.
15In this exercise, we vary the distribution of f W while holding x0 ￿xed. This is consistent with x0 being endogenously
chosen in period zero if the consumer learns about the true distribution of f W after x0 is set. In that case, the consumer
has a prior over possible distributions f W at date zero.
16(ii) When either A3 or A4 holds, for any sequence of increasing risks, equivalent relative










This proposition formalizes the main result of the paper: Consumption commitments magnify
the welfare cost of moderate risks (risks that usually do not induce households to abandon com-
mitments) relative to large risks. Part (i) shows that the risk premium demanded for moderate
shocks is greater for households that are more committed in the sense of having higher adjustment
costs for the commitment good. Part (ii) shows that households with commitments require greater
compensation per unit of risk for small shocks than they do for large shocks. Both results in the
proposition arise from the intuition that households with commitments are forced to deviate from
ideal consumption plans when faced with moderate shocks.
The results are illustrated in Figure IV, which plots ￿(:) as a function of the standard devia-
tion (￿) for a family of truncated lognormal risks for two agents with di⁄erent adjustment costs
(￿renters￿and ￿homeowners￿ ). Consistent with the proposition, the ￿gure shows that equivalent
relative risk aversion is high for small risks, but asymptotes to a low level as the size of risk increases.
In contrast, for a consumer with power utility and no commitments, equivalent relative risk aversion
is ￿ at by de￿nition. The ￿gure also shows that the consumer who faces higher adjustment costs is
more risk averse, consistent with part (i) of the proposition.
III. APPLICATIONS
III.A. Moderate-Stake Risk Aversion
As noted above, an important puzzle in expected utility theory is that plausible degrees of
risk aversion over small or moderate stakes imply implausibly high risk aversion over large-stake
risks. In this section, we assess the potential of the commitments model to resolve this puzzle using
calibrations similar to Rabin￿ s [2000]. In particular, we compute numerically a range of ￿moderate
stake￿shocks over which the model can explain high degrees of risk aversion.
The puzzle is illustrated in Table II, which has a structure analogous to Table I in Rabin [2000].
While Rabin gives calibration results that do not rely on functional form assumptions about utility,
we illustrate the puzzle here by assuming that agents have constant relative risk aversion preferences
for simplicity. Consider such an agent who, at an initial wealth level of $300,000, is indi⁄erent
between accepting and rejecting a 50-50, lose $1000, gain $g gamble, where g = $1025, $1050,
17$1100, or $1250. In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of the table, we report G values such that the same
agent is indi⁄erent between accepting a 50-50, lose $L, gain $G gamble for various levels of L. For
example, column 3 shows that if the individual is indi⁄erent between a 50-50 lose $1000/gain $1050
gamble, he will also be indi⁄erent between an 50-50 lose $15,000/gain $98,027 gamble.
As in Rabin￿ s table, an entry of 1 means that there is no ￿nite gain that would make the
individual indi⁄erent between accepting and rejecting the particular gamble. The fact that G = 1
for many large values of L in columns 1,3, 5, and 7 illustrates that plausible risk preferences for
gambles involving small or moderate stakes (L < $10;000) generate implausibly high levels of risk
aversion for gambles over higher stakes in the conventional no-commitments model.
The remainder of the table demonstrates that commitments can help resolve this puzzle by
breaking the link between risk preferences over moderate and large stakes. Columns 2,4, 6 and
8 show the risk preferences of a consumer with commitments who has period utility given by the
special case in (6). The utility function is calibrated such that the agent (1) has a commitment
budget share parameter of 50 percent, consistent with the evidence in section I and (2) is indi⁄erent
between accepting and rejecting an 50-50, lose $1000, gain g gamble, where g = $1025, $1050, $1100,
$1250 varies across the columns. The parameters of the utility function used in the calibrations
are described in the notes to Table II.
The e⁄ect of commitments on risk preferences can be seen in two ways. First, compare adjacent
pairs of odd and even columns, for example columns 3 and 4. For gambles where L < $10;000,
the agents with and without commitments have virtually identical risk preferences. However, for
gambles where L = $15;000 or higher, the consumer with commitments exhibits manifestly lower
risk aversion. For instance, the agent with commitments is indi⁄erent between a 50-50 lose $40,000/
gain $68,897 gamble, whereas no ￿nite gain is su¢ cient to compensate for a $40,000 loss for the
agent with standard power utility.
Now compare the four commitment consumers, across columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. This compari-
son shows that higher risk aversion over moderate stake risks need not translate into higher risk
aversion for large gambles for agents with commitments. For example, the moderate loss of $5,000
necessitates an o⁄setting gain of only $5,695 for the consumer in column 2, while it requires a much
higher gain of $14,879 for the consumer in column 8. Yet for large gambles the risk preferences of
these two consumers are almost identical: a loss of $25,000 requires a gain of $43,003 in column 2
and a gain of $44,746 in column 8.
These two results arise from the fact that risk preferences over small and large risks are controlled
18by distinct parameters when agents have commitments. Risk aversion over small risks is essentially
determined by the curvature over adjustable consumption (food) and the commitment share, while
risk aversion over large risks is determined by curvature over commitment consumption (housing).
In response to a large enough loss or gain, the agent drops his commitments and re-optimizes,
absorbing much of the shock by changing commitment consumption. As a result, agents with
commitments can have high degrees of risk aversion over moderate stakes because they are forced
to concentrate adjustments on food, while having lower large-stake risk aversion because they can
adjust on other margins over which utility is less curved. In contrast, agents without commitments
can only be risk averse over moderate stakes if they have very rapidly diminishing marginal utility
over all goods. This rapidly diminishing marginal utility necessarily translates into implausible
risk aversion over large stakes.
For a consumer with commitments, high levels of risk aversion over moderate stakes (as in the
columns on the right side of Table II) require high levels of curvature over food, ￿f. The table
shows the calibrated ￿f parameter implied by the risk preferences in each column. One may be
concerned that the ￿f values reported are high relative to familiar CRRA values between 1-5. It
is important to note, however, that the criterion typically used to evaluate whether a particular
value for the CRRA is plausible is to look at implied behavior over risky choices [as in Mankiw
and Zeldes, 1991, Barsky et al. 1997]. As the table demonstrates, a CRRA over food in excess
of 10 can indeed lead to plausible risk preferences in the commitments framework. The reason
that such values of CRRA over food generate risk preferences consistent with introspection is that
they apply only for moderate shocks. For larger shocks, the model implies much lower CRRA:
equivalent relative risk aversion for the gamble in the last row is between 2.4 and 2.8 in all columns
for the commitment consumer. This point mirrors Kandel and Stambaugh [1991] and Rabin and
Thaler￿ s [1998] point that observed risk preferences over moderate stakes are consistent with high
values of the CRRA, while observed risk preferences over larger stakes imply much lower values of
the CRRA. The commitments model provides a uni￿ed framework that endogenously generates
higher CRRA values for moderate shocks than large shocks.
Table II points to an important limitation of the model in explaining risk preferences over small
stakes. The ￿rst few rows in the table show that for small gambles (e.g. $100-$500 stakes), a
consumer with commitments behaves in essentially the same way as a standard CRRA expected
utility maximizer. Even in the most risk-averse speci￿cation reported (columns 7-8), the consumer
is willing to accept an 50-50 gamble of lose $100/ gain $102. Hence, commitments cannot generate
19substantial risk aversion with respect to gambles with stakes below $500. The reason is that the
commitments model exhibits approximate risk neutrality for small stakes, since the induced utility
vc(W) remains locally linear.
These calibrations suggest that commitments can explain a high level of risk aversion with
respect to gambles that involve stakes of approximately $1,000-$10,000. This range includes many
risks of interest in the economics literature, including unemployment, temporary illness or injury,
and vehicle or property damage.
III.B. Social Insurance
The optimal structure of social insurance programs and redistributive tax policies has attracted
considerable attention in public ￿nance. Since risk preferences are a key factor in this analysis,
commitments have implications for the design of such programs, which we brie￿ y explore below.
Consider an example where an agent faces the risk of losing $Z of wealth with probability p.
Let Wg denote the agent￿ s lifetime wealth in the good state, where the shock does not occur. An
actuarially fair insurance program that raises wealth in the bad state by $1 must lower wealth in
the good state by p=(1 ￿ p). The change in expected utility from such a program is
g MWG(Z) = pv0(Wg ￿ Z) ￿ (1 ￿ p)
p
1 ￿ p
v0(Wg) = p(v0(Wg ￿ Z) ￿ v0(Wg)).
To convert this expression into a money metric, we normalize g MWG by the welfare gain from a
$1 increase in consumption in the good state. The marginal welfare gain from an extra $1 of




v0(Wg ￿ Z) ￿ v0(Wg)
v0(Wg)
.
This formula re￿ ects the well-known intuition that the marginal value of insurance depends on the
di⁄erence in marginal utilities between the good and bad states.
Figure V plots MWG(Z) for an agent with and without commitments. Without commitments
(k = 0), MWG(Z) increases with Z because v0(W0 ￿Z) increases monotonically with Z. Insuring
large shocks is more valuable than insuring small shocks when all goods are freely adjustable.
Commitments alter this reasoning. As shown in Proposition 1, commitments make v0(Wg ￿ Z) a
non-monotonic function of Z, because the marginal utility of consumption falls discontinuously at
W = s. As a result, the marginal value of insuring some large shocks may be smaller than the
20marginal value of insuring some moderate shocks. In the example shown in the ￿gure, the marginal
dollar of insurance for a $10,000 loss raises welfare more than twice as much as the marginal dollar
of insurance for a loss of $40,000.
The mechanism underlying the di⁄erence between the marginal welfare cost of small vs. large
shocks is that commitments are more likely to be abandoned when households are hit by large
shocks. To assess the empirical relevance of this mechanism, we compare consumption responses
to small vs. large shocks in the PSID. We classify an unemployment shock as a ￿large￿shock if the
head￿ s wage income loss due to unemployment exceeds 33 percent, i.e. total wage income in year
0 is at least 33 percent less than total wage income in the year prior to the shock. We classify a
shock as ￿small￿if the wage income loss is between 0 and 33 percent. By this classi￿cation, there
are 455 ￿large￿shocks and 517 ￿small￿shocks in the data.
Table III reports the results of this analysis. When hit by a small shock, households that
choose to move reduce food and housing consumption by 10 percent, while non-movers reduce
food consumption by 5 percent (and housing by 0). 31 percent of households move in the year
that a small shock occurs. When hit by a large shock, movers reduce food and housing by 13-14
percent, while non-movers reduce food by 14 percent. 40 percent of households move following
large shocks, showing that more households cross the boundary of the (S,s) band and abandon
prior commitments following large shocks. This evidence supports the mechanism through which
commitments amplify the welfare cost of moderate scale shocks relative to large shocks. For larger
shocks, more individuals choose not to bear the cost of reducing food sharply, and mitigate the
welfare cost of the shock by re-optimizing fully over both goods.
These results could have practical implications for the optimal design of programs such as
unemployment insurance (UI) and disability insurance (DI). The key tradeo⁄ faced by a social
planner in designing such policies is to balance the bene￿ts of consumption smoothing with the
moral hazard cost of distorting incentives (e.g. inducing agents to work less). Commitments can
a⁄ect this tradeo⁄ in several ways. For example, Chetty [2003] shows that ampli￿ed moderate
stake risk aversion results in a signi￿cantly higher optimal bene￿t rate for UI in a model with
commitments relative to Gruber￿ s [1997] calibrations in the one-good model.16 In the commitments
model, the optimal wage replacement rate for UI could potentially be higher than for DI ￿in contrast
with the standard model ￿since disability is a large shock that could induce adjustment on many
16Consistent with this result, commitments appear to guide the choice of unemployment bene￿t levels in practice.
In the Arizona State Bene￿t Adequacy Study, Burgess et al. [1981] de￿nes ￿bene￿t adequacy￿in terms of covering
￿the total of necessary/obligated expenses for the entire household.￿
21margins. More broadly, commitments create a force toward providing more insurance for short-
term, moderate-stake shocks relative to long-term welfare programs. We defer formal analysis of
these normative issues to future work.
III.C. Labor Supply
Since the seminal studies of Woytinsky [1940] and Mincer [1962], a large literature in labor
economics has studied ￿added worker e⁄ects￿ ￿the entry of spouses into the labor force when
primary earners become unemployed (see e.g., Ashenfelter [1980]; Lundberg [1985]; Tano [1993];
Stephens [2002]). By changing the base of individuals actively seeking work, the added worker
e⁄ect can a⁄ect the measurement of the unemployment rate, the shape of the aggregate labor
supply curve, and the dynamics of labor force participation.
An added worker e⁄ect requires that the income elasticity of labor supply is large in the short
run. However, most studies of long-run labor supply behavior ￿nd that the income elasticity of
labor supply is small and perhaps even zero (see e.g., Pencavel [1986], and Blundell and MaCurdy
[1999]). Why might income e⁄ects on labor supply be larger in the short run than the long run?
The commitments model provides a straightforward answer to this question. To show this, we





where period utility u(f;x;l) is de￿ned over food, housing, and spouse￿ s labor supply, l. To
facilitate analysis of added worker e⁄ects, we assume that the primary earner￿ s labor supply is
exogenously determined and a⁄ects the household￿ s problem only by changing its wealth. We
make the following regularity assumptions about utility: (1) u is strictly increasing in f and x,
strictly decreasing in l, strictly concave and twice di⁄erentiable; (2) uf;x ￿ 0, uf;l ￿ 0 and ux;l ￿ 0,
conditions which guarantee that f, x, and leisure are normal goods [Chipman 1977]; and (3)
limf!1 uf = 0, the Inada condition for food.
Let w denote the spouse￿ s wage rate, which is ￿xed over time. The household￿ s dynamic
budget constraint continues to be given by equation (1), with period income de￿ned as yt = wlt.
As above, we assume that there is no uncertainty after period 1. The optimal consumption pro￿les
are therefore ￿ at: xt = x1, ft = f1 and lt = l1 for all 1 ￿ t ￿ T.
Let W denote the household￿ s wealth (unearned income) at the beginning of period 1, excluding
wage income earned in period 1 and subsequent periods. Our objective is to characterize the e⁄ect
22of changes in W ￿which may occur e.g., because the primary earner becomes unemployed ￿on l1,
the spouse￿ s labor supply in period 1. At any given W, the household￿ s problem can be solved
with a two-step procedure: 1) ￿nd the optimal consumption bundle of f1 and l1 for any given x1;
(2) solve for the optimal level of x1. This motivates the following expression for the elasticity of
labor supply in period 1 with respect to period 1 wealth:
"l1;W = "l1;W j x1 + "l1;x1 ￿ "x1;W,
where "l1;W j x1 is the semi-elasticity of l1 with respect to W, holding ￿xed x1. Note that this
formula holds both with and without adjustment costs.
Given prior commitments x0, de￿ne W to be the wealth level at which a household that faces
no adjustment costs would optimally choose xn(W) = x0 in period 1. Let "c
l;W denote the wealth
elasticity of labor supply for a household with commitments and "n
l;W denote the corresponding
parameter for one without commitments. Since "l1;W j x1 does not depend on the adjustment cost
k at W = W, the di⁄erence in the wealth elasticities in the commitment and no-commitment cases










x1;W > 0 and "n
l1;x1 > 0. This expression shows that the wealth elasticity of labor supply
is larger in magnitude when households have commitments. Insofar as commitments are retained
when households face small or temporary wealth ￿ uctuations but are adjusted in the long run, this
result implies that the wealth (unearned income) elasticity of labor supply is larger in the short
run than the long run.
To understand the intuition for this result, suppose the primary earner is temporarily unem-
ployed. If the household has commitments that it wishes to maintain, there is a strong incentive for
spouses to enter the labor force to help pay the mortgage and other bills, especially in the presence
of liquidity constraints. In contrast, a household that experiences a large, permanent change in
wealth will reoptimize on all margins of consumption in the long run, reducing the pressure to make
large adjustments on l. In the extreme case where utility is quasilinear in x, the no-commitment
(long run) income e⁄ect is zero, while the short-run income e⁄ect is positive.
23The fact that commitments amplify income e⁄ects in the short run also has implications for the
wage elasticity of labor supply, which includes both an income and substitution e⁄ect. Studies of
behavioral responses to taxation generally ￿nd small wage elasticities for households with incomes
below $100,000 (e.g., Saez [2004]). The inability to fully reoptimize consumption in the short run
may dampen responses to tax reforms because of temporarily ampli￿ed income e⁄ects. In the
short run, households may be reluctant to cut labor supply in response to a tax increase if they
have made prior commitments. However, taxes may still have signi￿cant e⁄ects on labor supply in
the long run, when short-run income needs due to commitments are diminished. Hence, empirical
studies that focus on short-run changes in behavior could understate the distortionary e⁄ects of
taxation.
Consistent with the basic arguments made above, Fortin [1995] and Del Boca and Lusardi [2003]
present evidence that mortgage commitments increase secondary earners￿labor supply. Examining
whether commitments a⁄ect behavioral responses to changes in unearned income and wages could
shed further light on the added worker e⁄ect and the e¢ ciency costs of income taxation.
III.D. Other Applications
Consumption commitments could shed light on a number of other issues, including the following:
[Portfolio Choice] By amplifying risk aversion, commitments induce investors to hold safer
portfolios. Since risk aversion over moderate risks varies with the location of W in the (S,s) band
(Proposition 1), households in the middle of the band should particularly safe portfolios. Consistent
with this prediction, Chetty and Szeidl [2005a] present empirical evidence that households who
moved recently for exogenous reasons and are therefore close to the middle of the band hold safer
portfolios, suggesting that the model can be useful in understanding heterogeneity in portfolio
choice behavior. The model also o⁄ers normative lessons for asset allocation ￿e.g., institutions
with signi￿cant ￿nancial commitments should hold safer portfolios.
[Asset pricing] Flavin and Nakagawa [2003] analyze asset pricing in a two-good adjustment cost
model with complementarity between food and housing. They show that this model outperforms
existing models in matching consumption dynamics and asset prices because it generates sluggish
adjustment of consumption in response to shocks, as in habit formation models.
[Habit formation] Chetty and Szeidl [2005b] aggregate the commitments model with separable
utility in an economy of agents with heterogeneous commitments. They show formally that aggre-
gate dynamics in this economy coincide with those of a representative-consumer model with habit
24formation preferences. In this sense, commitments can provide non-psychological, neoclassical
microfoundations for habit formation preferences widely used in macroeconomics and ￿nance.
[Gambling] The model may help explain why racetrack bettors prefer skewed bets that have long
odds and large payo⁄s [Golec and Tamarkin 1998; Jullien and Salanie 2000], and why individuals
are more likely to participate in some lotteries that have very large payo⁄s [Clotfelter and Cook
1987]. Because commitments are endogenous to wealth, the model can generate gambling motives
at all wealth levels, in contrast with an exogenous non-concave utility speci￿cation as in Friedman
and Savage [1948].
[Wage rigidities] Committed individuals may prefer a gamble in which they get ￿red with a
small probability rather than take a reduction in wages with certainty, explaining workers￿disdain
for small wage cuts as discussed in Bewley [1999]. Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Silverman [2004]
show formally that ￿rms may choose to lay o⁄ workers instead of reducing wages in equilibrium in
a model with commitments.
IV. CONCLUSION
When agents have consumption commitments, risk aversion is context-speci￿c, and in partic-
ular varies with the scale of the risk. Commitments increase risk aversion over moderate shocks
relative to large shocks by forcing households to concentrate moderate shocks on a subset of con-
sumption goods. Agents may also be risk-seeking in certain ranges because commitments induce
non-concavities in utility over wealth. Empirical evidence on consumption responses to unemploy-
ment shocks shows that housing commitments force households to concentrate smaller shocks on
adjustable goods such as food, as the model predicts.
In this paper, we explored applications of commitments to models where forward-looking agents
maximize the present discounted value of expected utility. A growing literature in psychology
and economics has argued that individuals may have present-biased preferences, e.g., because of
myopia, self-control problems, or biased expectations. Such biases could lead to over-commitment
ex-ante, further amplifying the e⁄ect of commitments on the welfare cost of shocks. Present-
biased individuals may face a tradeo⁄ between the bene￿ts of commitments as a saving device
(as in Laibson [1997]) and the welfare costs of in￿ exibility when shocks occur ex-post. Present-
biases could also augment the gambling motive for some agents with commitments. It would be
interesting to explore the interface between commitments and models with imperfect optimization
in future work.
25APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. We ￿rst establish that there is a range of wealth levels for which it is optimal
not to change x (i.e., not to move). The maximization problem of a consumer who moves in
period 1 is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a consumer with initial wealth W ￿ kx0 and no
adjustment costs over goods. By A2, both f and x are normal goods for this consumer [Chipman
1977]. As leftover wealth W ￿ kx0 ! 0, optimal consumption f;x ! 0 by the budget constraint.
When W ! 1, by A1, f;x ! 1. These results show that the optimal choice of x following a move
is a strictly increasing function of W that maps onto the set of positive reals and is continuous by
the theorem of the maximum. It follows that there exist wealth levels WA < WB such that the
optimal choice of x following a move is x0(1 ￿ k=T) when W = WA and x0 when W = WB.
For all WA ￿ W ￿ WB, the consumer optimally chooses not to move. This is because the
optimal choice of x following a move must satisfy x0(1 ￿ k=T) ￿ x ￿ x0 for W in this range.
Hence, for wealth levels between WA and WB lifetime commitment spending is at least Tx0 ￿kx0.
Given the leftover budget W ￿kx0 following a move, the consumer can allocate at most W ￿Tx0 on
food consumption, which is exactly how much he allocates if he decides not to move. Consequently,
when WA ￿ W ￿ WB, both food and commitment consumption would fall if the consumer were to
move, which shows that staying is optimal in this range.
The optimal policy of the consumer is to move if and only if vm(W;x0) > v0(W;x0). We now
establish that vm and v0 intersect exactly twice, at s < WA and at S > WB. First note that the
envelope theorem implies vm
1 (W;x0) = T ￿ u1(fm;xm) where fm and xm are the optimal choices
when moving, and that v0
1(W;x0) = T ￿ u1(W=T ￿ x0;x0). For W < WA, we have established that
optimal housing after a move satis￿es xm < x0(1 ￿ k=T). Since fm + xm = (W ￿ kx0)=T, this
implies fm > W=T ￿ x0. Therefore
vm
1 (W;x0) = Tu1(fm;xm) < Tu1(W=T ￿ x0;x0) = v0
1(W;x0)
because u12 ￿ 0 by assumption. Similarly, when W > WB, the optimal housing choice satis￿es
xm > x0 and hence fm < W=T ￿ x0 by the budget constraint, which implies
vm
1 (W;x0) = Tu1(fm;xm) > Tu1(W=T ￿ x0;x0) = v0
1(W;x0):
These inequalities imply that for W < WA, v0 is steeper than vm, and that for W > WB, v0 is not
26as steep as vm. We also know from the analysis above that when WA ￿ W ￿ WB, the function v0
lies above vm and that staying is optimal. Together, these results imply that vm and v0 intersect
at most once in region W < WA, and they intersect at most once in region W > WB as well. To
show that the optimal policy is described by an (S;s) band, we need to prove that intersections do
occur in both of these regions. We begin with W < WA. For W small, A1 implies that u(f;x0) will
be arbitrarily close to the smallest possible utility level inff;x u(f;x). By de￿nition this must be
smaller than period utility when moving, hence vm(W;x0)￿v0(W;x0) is positive for W su¢ ciently
small, implying that an intersection exists in this range. For W > WB, the Inada conditions in A1
can be used to establish that vm(W;x0) ￿ v0(W;x0) becomes positive as W grows without bound.
To establish (iii), note that an increase in k reduces vm(W;x0) for each value of W and x0, while
it does not a⁄ect v0(W;x0). As a result, when k increases to k0, the consumer is no longer indi⁄erent
between staying and moving at wealth level s(k). The utility of moving has decreased, and the
consumer strictly prefers to stay. This implies that s(k0) < s(k), and an analogous argument can
be used for S.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Under A3, the optimal choice of both f and x is proportional to W
for a household without adjustment costs. Therefore vn(W) is proportional to W1￿￿ and hence
￿n(W) = ￿. By homogeneity, for any f and x, u1(f;x)f+u2(f;x)x = (1￿￿)u(f;x). Di⁄erentiating







which shows that ￿f(f;x) ￿ ￿ for all f and x by A2. But ￿c = ￿f"c
f;W > ￿ because "c
f;W =
W=(Tf) > 1.









and since a weighted average of "n
f;W and "n
x;W equals 1, it follows that "n
f;W < 1. To compute risk
aversion, recall ￿n(W) = ￿f"n
f;W < ￿f, while ￿c = ￿f"c
f;W > ￿f because "c
f;W = W=(Tf) > 1.
(ii) The proof follows from (i). Under A3, ￿c(W0) = ￿W0=(W0 ￿ kx0) while ￿c(W) ￿ ￿W=(W ￿ Tx0)
as shown above. Given that W ￿ S, W0=(W0 ￿ kx0) ￿ W=(W ￿ Tx0) holds as long as W0 > kS=T.
Under A4, ￿c(W0) < ￿fW0=(W0 ￿ kx0) while ￿c(W) = ￿fW=(W ￿ Tx0) and the result follows
when W0 > kS=T.
27(iii) We have vc
1(s￿;x0) = vm
1 (s;x0) and vc
1(s+;x0) = v0
1(s;x0). By the proof of Lemma 1,
vm
1 (s;x0) < v0
1(s;x0) since s < WA. As a result, vc
1(s￿;x0) < vc
1(s+;x0). Now consider W = s,
and let e Z be a gamble that pays ￿ or ￿￿ with equal probabilities. Then W + e Z will be preferred to
a sure payment of W if and only if vc(s + ￿;x0) + vc(s ￿ ￿;x0) > 2vc(s;x0) or equivalently if
vc(s + ￿;x0) ￿ vc(s;x0)
￿
￿
vc(s;x0) ￿ vc(s ￿ ￿;x0)
￿
> 0.
In this expression, as ￿ ! 0 the left hand side converges to vc
1(s+;x0)￿vc
1(s￿;x0) > 0, hence for ￿
small enough the inequality will be satis￿ed. A similar argument establishes the claim for W = S.
There exist other wealth levels besides s and S for which the claim is true. To see why, consider
some ￿ > 0 which satis￿es the above inequality. By continuity, for ￿ small enough in absolute value,
1 ￿ ￿
2
￿ vc(s + ￿;x0) +
1 + ￿
2
￿ vc(s ￿ ￿;x0) > vc(s ￿ ￿￿;x0),
which establishes the claim for W = s￿ ￿￿. Since ￿ can be either positive or negative, there exists
an interval of initial wealth levels around s for which one can ￿nd fair gambles that are attractive
for the household. A similar statement holds at S as well.
Proof for Section II.C: Borrowing constraints. Let superscript BC denote an environment in which
the consumer faces borrowing constraints, and assume that A1 and A2 are satis￿ed.
Claim Let u(f;x) satisfy either A3 and the assumption that ￿f non-increasing in f, or A4
and the assumption that "n
f;E is non-increasing in E. Then, as long as sBC < W < WBC, i.e., for
wealth levels where the borrowing constraint binds but moving is not optimal:
(10) ￿c;BC(W;x0) ￿ ￿n;BC(W) ￿ T ￿ [￿c(W;x0) ￿ ￿n(W)]:
Proof. Let E = f1 +x1 denote total expenditure in period 1, and suppose the household does








￿c(W;x0) = ￿f ￿ "c
f;E ￿ "E;W:
These equations follow directly from (3) and (4), using the fact that "f;E ￿ "E;W = "f;W. The
equations are valid expressions for the CRRA irrespective of whether the consumer faces borrowing
28constraints or not. Borrowing constraints a⁄ect risk aversion by altering the "E;W term on the right
hand side of both expressions in (11). When the borrowing constraint does not bind, "E;W = 1;
when it binds, "E;W = W=E. Note that when the borrowing constraint binds, W=E > T, because
the consumer is forced to spend less than a share 1=T of lifetime wealth W on period 1 expenditures.
Under A3, rewriting both sides of (10) using (11), noting that ￿n;BC = ￿ ￿ "BC
E;W and ￿n = ￿,
and using the fact that "BC





f;E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿c
f"c
f;E ￿ ￿:



























f;E because Ec;BC ￿ Ec. Moreover, "
n;BC
f;E ￿ "n
f;E holds by assumption since
Ec;BC ￿ Ec.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let vk;c(W;x0) denote the value function and let Wk;CE be the certainty
equivalent of the wealth gamble f W when adjustment costs equal k. Note that k1 < k2 implies
vk1;c(W;x0) ￿ vk2;c(W;x0) for all W, and therefore
vk1;c(Wk1;CE;x0) = Evk1;c(f W;x0) ￿ Evk2;c(f W;x0) = vk2;c(Wk2;CE;x0):
Since Wk1;CE 2 (sk1;Sk1), we have vk1;c(Wk1;CE;x0) = vk2;c(Wk1;CE;x0) which combined with the
above chain of inequalities gives Wk1;CE ￿ Wk2;CE and hence ￿(f W;x0;k1) ￿ ￿(f W;x0;k2).
(ii) We ￿rst show that for ￿ small, the Arrow-Pratt approximation holds for the commit-
ments utility function. For simplicity, use the notation that WCE
￿ = WCE(f W￿;x0;k) and v (W) =
vc (W;x0). Let M3
￿ =E
￿￿









. Note that v (W) is three times continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing
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. A second-order Taylor approximation of v around EW yields
v (W) = v (EW) + v0 (EW) ￿ [W ￿ EW] +
1
2
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where the bound on the error term follows from
￿ ￿WCE
￿ ￿ EW























v00 (EW) ￿ EW
v0 (EW)
+ o(1).
This expression establishes that for small risks, the proportional risk premium per unit risk is
approximately equal to the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion as claimed in the text.





twice the risk premium per unit of risk. By (15) we have lim￿!0 ￿￿ = ￿c(Ef W;x0). Note that
￿￿ only depends on the certainty equivalent and the variance of the risk, and hence for each ￿ it














+o(1). Note that the error in this expression is uniformly








which gives the desired result for small ￿.
30When ￿ grows without bound, f W￿ assigns probability close to 1 to the region outside the
interval (s;S) and the certainty equivalent will also be outside this range. By (ii) of Proposition
1, outside the (S;s)-band relative risk aversion is always less than ￿c(Ef W;x0). This implies that
in the range W = 2 (s;S) and W > kS=T, the utility function vm(W;x0) is everywhere less risk
averse than power utility with curvature ￿c(Ef W;x0). Because a utility function that is everywhere





will be larger than it is for power utility with curvature ￿c(Ef W;x0). As
a result, equivalent relative risk aversion is less than ￿c(Ef W;x0) for ￿ large, completing the proof.
Proof that equivalent relative risk aversion is well de￿ned. Consider a gamble f W that has certainty
equivalent WCE ￿Ef W for some consumer. Let WCE (￿) be the certainty equivalent of f W under
CRRA utility with coe¢ cient ￿. Note that WCE (￿) is well-de￿ned because the support of f W
is bounded away from zero and Ef W is assumed to be ￿nite. Moreover, WCE (0) ￿ WCE by
assumption, and that lim￿!1 WCE (￿) > WCE because the certainty equivalent for an in￿nitely
risk averse consumer is the lower bound of the support of f W, which is smaller than the certainty
equivalent for any investor with concave utility. Because WCE (￿) is continuous, there must be
some ￿￿ where WCE (￿￿) = WCE. Also, WCE (￿) is strictly decreasing, because a CRRA utility
function with higher curvature is everywhere more risk averse, which means that it has a strictly
higher risk premium for all non-in￿nitesimal risks. Hence equivalent relative risk aversion ￿￿ is
uniquely determined.
Proof that W is well-de￿ned in Section III.C. Since x is a normal good, xn(W) is increasing. For
W su¢ ciently low (perhaps negative) the optimal choice of x is close to zero since l is bounded from
above; as W increases, the optimal level of x grows without bound because the marginal utility of
food goes to zero. For some intermediate value W, xn(W) = x0.
31APPENDIX B: DATA
Expenditure shares (Table I). We compute the expenditure shares for all categories using the
summary expenditure variables in the CEX FMLY 1990Q1-1999Q4 ￿les. We convert all variables
to real 2000 dollars using the CPI. We de￿ne ￿total expenditure￿as the sum of all expenditures
minus mandatory contributions to pensions (TOTEXP-PERINS). To avoid bias from selective
attrition in the construction of expenditure shares, we include data from only the ￿rst interview
(CEX interview 2) for each household in the share calculations, summing the PQ and CQ variables
to obtain quarterly expenditure measures. We de￿ne aggregate expenditure as the sum of total
expenditure across all households in their ￿rst interview. Similarly, we de￿ne aggregate expenditure
on category j as the sum of expenditures on category j by all households in the dataset in their ￿rst
interview. Finally, we de￿ne the aggregate expenditure share of good j as aggregate expenditure
on j divided by aggregate expenditure.
We de￿ne ￿shelter￿as total expenditures on housing (HOUS) minus expenditures on utilities,
furniture/appliances, and household operations. ￿Household operations￿ (HOUSOP) includes
expenses such as cleaning, daycare, etc. We de￿ne ￿other transportation￿as total expenditures
on transportation (TRANS) minus expenditures on gas, maintenance, and public transportation.
Consumption growth rates (Figure I and Table I). We use the CEX FMLY ￿les to
compute annual nominal consumption growth for all goods except food, housing, and cars. For
food and housing, we use data from the PSID 1967-1997 family ￿les. Details on the de￿nition
of food and housing in this dataset are given in the description of the event studies below. We
compute changes in car consumption using data from the CEX OVB ￿les 1990Q1-1999Q4. In all
three datasets, we make no exclusions and include every observation with non-missing data in the
sample.
We de￿ne the consumption growth rate of food as the log di⁄erence in nominal expenditures
between year t and year t ￿ 1 for household i in year t in the PSID. For other nondurables
(utilities, housing operations, other transportation, health insurance, other health, entertainment,
personal care, reading, education, tobacco, miscellaneous), we de￿ne the consumption growth rate
of category j for household i as the log di⁄erence in nominal expenditures between interview 5 and
interview 2 for household i in the CEX. Note that individuals who report zero expenditures are
omitted from our analysis since their consumption growth rates are unde￿ned.
For housing (shelter), we follow the procedure described in the text using nominal PSID data on
rent and housing values, with an adjustment for missing data. In 8.73 percent of the observations,
32the household head reports moving within the past year but the housing growth rate is unde￿ned
because (a) the individual switches from renting to owning or vice versa, (b) the individual splits
o⁄ from a previous household and starts a new household, or (c) the home value or rent data is
missing. Since these observations likely involve growth rates of housing consumption di⁄erent
from zero, the original histogram drawn with the non-missing observations overstates the fraction
of zeros. We correct for this bias by scaling down the height of the bar centered at zero in the
original histogram by 8.73 percent to arrive at the histogram shown in Figure Ib.
For cars, we de￿ne the change in car consumption as 0 for those who do not report buying or
selling a car in the OVB ￿les while they are in the CEX sample. For those who do report buying
or selling, we de￿ne the change in car consumption as follows. We ￿rst construct a measure of
the initial value of the car stock when the household enters the sample. We do so by summing
the reported purchase prices of all cars owned by the household. Since purchase prices of older
cars are frequently missing, we impute the values of these cars by replacing all missing observations
with the average purchase price reported in that calendar year for a car of the reported model year.
We compute the value of the car stock at the end of the sample by adding (or subtracting) the
purchase price of all purchased (or sold) cars during the sample period to the imputed value of the
initial car stock. Finally, we compute growth in car consumption as the log di⁄erence between the
nominal values of the end-of-sample car stock and initial car stock.
For apparel and furniture, we compute the level change in consumption as total reported ex-
penditures over the four quarters in the CEX minus SALEINCX, which gives data on total sales
of all small durables reported by the household. We de￿ ate this net expenditure measure using
the CPI to convert all the level changes to real 2000 dollars. Since SALEINCX includes sales of all
small durables, it overstates sales of apparel or furniture alone. Thus our estimates give an upper
bound on the frequency of consumption reductions in these categories.
The histograms in Figure I show the distribution of growth rates and level changes for six
categories. The histograms in Figures 1a-1e re drawn with a bin size of 0.1, with a range of -1.05
to +1.05. The histogram in Figure If is drawn with a bin size of $200, with a range of -$2,000 to
$2,000. We compute the fraction of households that reduce consumption of each category as the
share of observations with negative net expenditures for apparel and furniture, and as the share of
observations with negative growth rates for all other categories. For housing, we assume that half
of the movers with missing housing growth data reduce housing consumption, and add this fraction
(8.73/2 percent) to the fraction of observed reductions to obtain the statistic reported in Table I.
33Event Studies of Unemployment (Figure II and Table III). We obtain data on the
head of household￿ s employment status at the time of each interview from the PSID family ￿les.
We de￿ne an individual as unemployed if they report working at the previous interview and being
unemployed or temporarily laid o⁄ in the current interview. Prior to 1976, one category (code 1)
includes both unemployed and temporarily laid o⁄ individuals. After 1976, this category is split
into one for unemployed and another for temporarily laid o⁄. We combine these two categories
(codes 1 and 2) after 1976 to obtain a consistent de￿nition of unemployment across years.
Food consumption is de￿ned in all years as the sum of food consumed in the home, food
consumed outside the home, and the subsidy value of food stamps, following Zeldes [1989]. From
1968 to 1974, the question on food stamps asks about the amount received last year. After 1975
the variable is de￿ned as the amount last month, which we scale up to an annual value. For some
years in the 1970s, some observations include food stamps in the ￿food at home￿variable; in these
cases, we subtracted food stamps from food at home to avoid double counting. After 1994, the raw
family data are available in a di⁄erent form, which gives data on amounts and time periods. We
multiply these and scale up to annual values to obtain a food consumption series that is consistent
across years. Food growth is de￿ned as the log change in food expenditure from year t-1 to year
t. As above, housing consumption growth is de￿ned as zero for non-movers, log change in annual
rent for renters who move, and log change in house value for homeowners who move.
The food, rent, and home value data are de￿ ated using food and housing price de￿ ators from
the CPI to obtain real growth rates. Though the consumption data are reported at an annual
frequency, the framing of the consumption questions refers to the point of the interview. As pointed
out by Zeldes and Gruber, this justi￿es the use of these variables as measures of consumption during
the time of the interview rather than measures of total consumption over the past year.
We make three exclusions on the PSID dataset to arrive at our ￿nal sample for the analysis of
unemployment shocks: (1) we include only heads of household between the ages of 20 and 65, (2)
we include only those who report exactly one unemployment spell during the panel, (3) we exclude
observations with changes in the number of people in the household to avoid introducing noise in
the consumption measures because of changes in household composition. Figure II and Table III
are constructed using this sample.
34APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF EVENT-STUDY RESULTS
We evaluate the robustness of the graphical results in Figure II by estimating a set of regres-
sions augmented with covariates to control for potential di⁄erences across homeowners and renters.
Appendix Table I gives summary statistics for homeowners and renters in the PSID sample to show
how observable characteristics di⁄er between the two groups.
In the interest of making fewer functional form assumptions, we estimate separate equations for
homeowners and renters, permitting all the parameters of the estimating equation to vary across
the groups. The estimating equation used in the analysis has the following form:
(16) git = ￿ + ￿ ￿ unempit + ￿1 ￿ (Xit ￿ X) + ￿2 ￿ (Xit ￿ X) ￿ unempit + "i
where gt = log(ct)￿log(ct￿1) denotes the growth rate of a consumption measure (food or housing)
as de￿ned in Section I and Appendix B, unempit = 1 if individual i is unemployed in year t and
0 otherwise, and Xit denotes a set of covariates. The key coe¢ cient of interest, ￿, measures
the impact of unemployment. Interactions of the Xit covariates with the unemployment shock
are permitted to control for di⁄erences in the e⁄ect of the shock across individuals with di⁄erent
characteristics. For example, homeowners may respond di⁄erently to a shock than renters because
they are older on average. The speci￿cation with controls addresses this concern by e⁄ectively
reporting estimates of ￿ for homeowners and renters of the same age. Since the covariates are
de-meaned by subtracting the sample mean (X), the coe¢ cient ￿ can be interpreted as the e⁄ect
of unemployment on consumption growth for an individual who has the mean characteristics of the
sample in terms of observables. Standard errors are clustered by household to allow for potential
serial correlation in consumption growth rates, e.g. due to measurement error, in all speci￿cations.
Appendix Table II reports several estimates of ￿ using variants of (16) for the ￿rst test comparing
homeowners and renters. The ￿rst two columns of the table give results on food and housing growth
for individuals who were renters prior to job loss, while columns three and four report analogous
estimates for those who were homeowners in year -1. Each row reports the four estimates of ￿ for
a di⁄erent speci￿cation of (16).
In the ￿rst row, we replicate the graphical analysis by estimating (16) without any controls (no
X). Not surprisingly, the estimates con￿rm the visual evidence. Renters cut food consumption
by 7.4% and housing consumption by 6.4%, whereas homeowners cut food by 9.4% and housing
by a statistically insigni￿cant 1.6%. The second row adds several covariates to the speci￿cation:
35age, marital status, education, number of people in household, lagged annual wage income, and
the unemployment rate in the state/year of the observation. This speci￿cation also includes year
dummies (not interacted with the unemployment dummy). We include the unemployment rate
control so that the key ￿ coe¢ cients are identi￿ed from idiosyncratic unemployment shocks, holding
local labor market conditions ￿xed. This helps address concerns that aggregate economic shocks
might impact homeowners and renters di⁄erently (e.g., by a⁄ecting local house prices) and thereby
bias the results. The estimates in row 2 are quite similar to those in row 1. Renters with observable
characteristics re￿ ective of the sample mean cut both food and housing by 7-10% on average when
unemployed, whereas homeowners with the same observables cut food signi￿cantly and housing
very little.
The estimates of ￿ in the ￿rst two speci￿cations are identi￿ed using both the ￿between￿variation
that compares growth rates across individuals who are unemployed and employed and the ￿within￿
variation that examines how growth rates for a particular individual change when unemployment
occurs. To address concerns that the between variation may be contaminated by di⁄erences in
unobservables across individuals, speci￿cation 3 replicates speci￿cation 2, but includes individual
￿xed e⁄ects to isolate the within variation. The inclusion of individual ￿xed e⁄ects does not change
the ￿ estimates appreciably.
One speci￿c concern in comparing homeowners and renters is that homeowners have higher
levels of initial food consumption, and therefore may be able to cut food expenditure without
su⁄ering much of a welfare cost. For example, individuals who spend a lot on food could simply
eat out less frequently or buy less caviar. Such consumers might choose to cut only f even if they
could adjust x freely. In this case, the observed drop in food but not housing for homeowners might
be caused by the nature of preferences at high levels of food consumption rather than distorted
behavior due to housing commitments. To address this concern, in speci￿cation 4 we eliminate
all individuals who report average annual food consumption per household member above the 75th
percentile ($3,758) and replicate the baseline speci￿cation (1). The estimates are very similar for
this low food group, showing that the results are not driven by variation in preferences across
di⁄erent levels of food consumption.
The graphical analysis and preceding regressions discard observations where households switch
between owning and renting because of the di¢ culty in de￿ning the growth rate of housing con-
sumption in these cases. In speci￿cation 5, we investigate whether this selective omission of
observations biases the results. To do so, we convert home values into rental equivalents using
36MSA-level estimates of the user cost of housing from Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai [2005]. We
impute an ￿annual rent￿for each homeowner by multiplying reported home value by the user cost
for the corresponding state/year pair (see Appendix B for details). We then compute the growth
rate of housing consumption as the change in rent for all observations in the sample, including
the own-rent switchers. Row 5 reports estimates analogous to those in row 1 with this alternate
de￿nition of housing consumption growth using the full sample. The estimates are similar, showing
that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the own-rent switchers.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of the results to outliers in consumption growth. We
replicate the baseline speci￿cation (1) after winsorizing the consumption growth data by recoding
food growth rates in the top 1% of the distribution to the 99th percentile of the food growth
distribution, which equals 1:37. Similarly, food growth rates in the bottom 1% are recoded to the
1st percentile of the distribution, ￿1:32. Housing growth rates are winsorized analogously. As
shown in row 6, the estimates do not change signi￿cantly when the outliers are trimmed.
The results in Appendix Table II are also robust to several other speci￿cation checks, including
the following: (1) changing the control set or including controls in the trimmed speci￿cation or
imputed rental value of housing speci￿cations; (2) dropping the small fraction (<2%) of observations
where food or housing consumption is imputed in the PSID; and (3) varying the assumptions
regarding error structure by clustering standard errors by state or year.
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40Consumption category
Shelter 22.2% 8.7%
Cars (excluding gas+maint) 14.7% 10.6%
Apparel 5.1% 0.3%
Furniture/Appliances 4.4% 0.5%
Health Insurance 3.0% 32.9%
Food and Alcohol 18.1% 42.8%
Utilities 8.2% 45.8%
Other Transportation 7.3% 49.2%
Entertainment 6.1% 48.7%
Out-of-Pocket Health 3.0% 47.8%
Education 2.0% 45.2%
Housing Operations 1.9% 44.3%
Personal Care 1.0% 41.0%
Tobacco 0.9% 36.6%
Reading Materials 0.6% 45.7%
Miscellaneous 1.5% 39.3%
NOTE--First column in table shows aggregate expenditure shares for consumption
categories in the CEX, following methodology described in the data appendix.
Second column reports fraction of households who actively reduce consumption
(beyond depreciation) of each category from first quarter to last quarter
in CEX. For apparel and furniture, households that reduce consumption are defined
as those with negative net expenditures.  For all other categories, households
that reduce expenditure are those with negative nominal growth (gcit < 0). See text
and data appendix for the definition of gcit.  Categories above dotted line are 







Expenditure Shares and Adjustment Frequencies 
Fraction of households
by Consumption CategoryTABLE II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loss (L) CRRA Commit CRRA Commit CRRA Commit CRRA Commit
100 100.2 100.2 100.5 100.5 101 101 102 102
200 201 201 204 202 204 204 208 208
500 506 506 524 512 524 524 555 555
1,000 1,025 1,025 1,050 1,050 1,100 1,100 1,250 1,250
2,000 2,103 2,103 2,211 2,211 2,446 2,446 3,373 3,370
5,000 5,695 5,695 6,573 6,570 9,388 9,359 ∞ 14,879
10,000 13,243 13,235 19,615 19,387 ∞ 23,388 ∞ 23,841
15,000 23,805 23,732 98,027 29,741 ∞ 30,149 ∞ 30,290
20,000 39,975 34,003 ∞ 36,660 ∞ 37,005 ∞ 37,239
25,000 69,671 43,003 ∞ 43,860 ∞ 44,388 ∞ 44,746
30,000 175,622 50,354 ∞ 51,591 ∞ 52,360 ∞ 52,884
40,000 ∞ 66,569 ∞ 68,897 ∞ 70,372 ∞ 71,393
50,000 ∞ 85,166 ∞ 89,184 ∞ 91,789 ∞ 93,623
Curvature 
over food ( γf) 3.7 7.1 13.6 29.9
ERRA for
L= 50,000 gamble 2.47 2.63 2.72 2.78
NOTE--Table shows risk preferences over gambles of various stakes for agents who are indifferent between
accepting and rejecting a 50-50 lose $1,000/gain $g gamble at wealth level $300,000, where g varies across
columns.  Entries in the table show values $G such that agent indifferent about the lose $1000/gain $g
gamble is also indifferent between accepting and rejecting a 50-50 lose $L/gain $G gamble, where L varies
across rows.  Odd columns show G values for agent with CRRA utility; even columns for consumer with
commitments.  Large entries of G are approximate.
Period utility for agent with commitments is given by equation (6) in text, with gx=1 (log utility)
T=5, lifetime wealth W=$300,000, adjustment cost k=0.2, and prior commitment x0 =$36,000.  Parameters 
γf and µ are chosen jointly so that (1) optimal unconstrained budget share of commitments is 50% at wealth
 $300,000 and (2) agent is indifferent with respect to lose $1000/gain $g gamble. Last row shows 
equivalent relative risk aversion (see definition in text) for the L=$50,000 gamble.
Risk Preferences over Small and Large Stakes: Calibration Results
  g = 1,025   g = 1,050   g = 1,100   g = 1,250Change in  Change in  Change in 
Percent housing for food for food for
who move movers movers non-movers
Small Unemployment Shock 31% -10% -10% -5%
Large Unemployment Shock 40% -14% -13% -14%
Year Prior to Shock 27% 13% -2% -1%
NOTE--Table shows fraction of movers and real annual growth rates of housing and food for movers 
and non-movers in response to small and large unemployment shocks. A shock is classified as large 
if total wage income of head in the year of job loss falls by 33% or more relative to wage income in
previous year. A shock is classified as small if total wage income loss of head is between 0% and 33%.  
Corresponding statistics for year prior to shock are shown as a basis for comparison.  The data is from
the PSID; see the data appendix for definition of sample and other details. "Change in housing" statistics
exclude observations when individuals switches from owning to renting or vice versa; "percent who move"
and "change in food" statistics include all observations.
TABLE III
Housing and Food Consumption Responses to Small and Large ShocksMean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Annual wage income $25,809 $26,512 $19,309 $16,924 $32,845 $32,535
Annual food expend. $6,439 $3,771 $5,601 $3,220 $7,351 $4,102
Annual rent/user cost $5,739 $5,517 $5,039 $5,119 $6,999 $5,964
House value $109,959 $154,691
Age 37.9 11.1 34.7 10.5 41.3 10.7
Married 56.1% 49.6% 38.4% 48.6% 75.4% 43.1%
Years of education 11.9 2.8 11.7 2.7 12.1 2.9
Household size 2.8 1.6 2.5 1.6 3.0 1.5
Moved within year 23.9% 42.9% 36.6% 48.7% 10.2% 30.3%
Rent-Own switch 5.7% 23.2% 6.8% 25.2% 4.6% 20.8%
Years in sample 20.8 10.5 19.7 10.7 21.7 10.2
Total Observations 23,752 12,377 11,375
NOTE--Data source: PSID, 1968-2003.  Statistics are based on a sample constructed as follows.
First, individuals who report becoming unemployed more than once while they are in the PSID are
excluded.  Second, only observations for household heads between ages of 20 and 65 are included.
Third, observations with a change in number of household members are excluded. All monetary variables are
in real 2003 dollars. Variable "moved within year" equals 1 iff household reports moving within one year after
interview. Variable "rent-own switch" equals 1 iff household switches from renting to owning or vice versa
in year after interview.  For homeowners, "annual rent" variable is defined as the user cost of housing
multiplied by home value; see Appendix B for details.
APPENDIX TABLE I
Pooled Renters Homeowners
Summary Statistics for PSID SampleSpecification Food Housing Food Housing
1. No controls -0.074 -0.064 -0.094 -0.016
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009)
2. Full controls -0.106 -0.070 -0.074 -0.022
(0.024) (0.018) (0.027) (0.016)
3. Indiv. fixed effects -0.117 -0.074 -0.071 -0.018
(0.031) (0.021) (0.033) (0.016)
4. Low food -0.069 -0.062 -0.095 -0.020
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.011)
5. Imputed rental values -0.074 -0.067 -0.094 0.010
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
6. Outliers trimmed -0.068 -0.056 -0.088 -0.013
(0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.007)
NOTE -- Table shows estimates of β coefficients in equation (14) in Appendix C.  Sample for left two columns
consists of all observations for households in PSID sample who rent in year before unemployment.  Sample
 for right two columns consists of all observations for households in PSID sample who are homeowners in
year before unemployment. See data appendix for definition of PSID sample.  
All standard errors are clustered by individual to correct for serial correlation.  Each row corresponds
to a different specification of equation (14).  See Appendix C for details of the specifications.  
Sample sizes for specifications 1, 2, 3, and 6 range from 7,902-10,206.
Sample size for specification 4 ranges from 6,711-7,659 and for specification 5 from 5,953-10,206.
Homeowners Renters
APPENDIX TABLE II
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(f) furniture
NOTE–These figures show the population distribution of annual changes in consumption of
various categories. Figures Ia-Ie plot histograms of the annual nominal growth rates of
consumption (gcit), following the methodology described in the text and data appendix. Figure
If plots a histogram of level changes in furniture consumption (total expenditures minus sales
of furniture over a one year period) in real 2000 dollars.FIGURE II
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Housing (Home Value) Food
b. Homeowners
Year relative to unemployment
NOTE– These figures plot real annual growth rates of food and housing consumption (changes
in log consumption) from year t-1 to year t. The year of job loss is normalized to t0 for all
individuals. The sample for Figure IIa includes households who rented in year -1. The sample
for Figure IIb includes households who owned a house in year -1. See the data appendix for
sample definitions and construction of growth rates.FIGURE IIIa
Effect of Commitments on Value Function
commitments
































NOTE–This figure shows the value function of a consumer with consumption commitments
(solid thick line). The adjustment cost makes it optimal not to move for W ∈ s,S. Outside the
(S,s) band, moving is optimal, because maximized utility when the consumer does not adjust
(dashed line) is below maximized utility with adjustment. The presence of commitments
increases curvature inside the (S,s) band relative to a consumer with no adjustment costs (solid
thin line). The figure is constructed using the same preferences and parameter values as
column 4 of Table II. See the notes to Table II for details.FIGURE IIIb
Commitments and Borrowing Constraints
commitments































NOTE–This figure shows the value function of a consumer with consumption commitments
and a borrowing constraint as specified in the text (dashed line). For high wealth realizations,
utility is identical to that of a consumer without a borrowing constraint (solid line). For low
wealth realizations utility falls sharply relative to the benchmark with no borrowing
constraints, because the consumer is unable to smooth the impact of a shock intertemporally.
The preferences and other parameters used to construct this figure are the same as those used
in column 4 of Table II.FIGURE IV
















































10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
high adjustment cost (“homeowner”)
low adjustment cost (“renter”)
power utility
NOTE–This figure plots equivalent relative risk aversion (see text for definition) versus the
size (standard deviation) of the risk. This curve is plotted for three types of individuals: one
with high adjustment costs, such as a homeowner (dotted line); one with lower adjustment
costs, such as a renter (solid line); and, as a basis for comparison, a consumer with no
commitments and power utility preferences with risk aversion   2 (dashed line). The
preferences used in constructing the homeowner and renter curves are the same as those used
in column 4 of Table II; the adjustment cost is k  1 for homeowners and k  0.2 for renters.
The shocks have lognormal distribution truncated at $80,000, with mean $300,000 and
standard deviation shown in the figure.FIGURE V
Marginal Welfare Gain from Insurance




































Size of negative shock (Z)
commitments
no commitments
NOTE–This figure plots the marginal welfare gain from an actuarially fair insurance program
that raises wealth in the bad state by $1, as a function of the size of the wealth loss in the bad
state. The marginal welfare gain is a money metric, defined as the increase in expected utility
from $1 of additional insurance divided by the change in expected utility from a $1 increase in
wealth in the good state (see text for details). The marginal value of insurance is
monotonically increasing in the case with no adjustment costs (dashed line) but non-monotonic
in the presence of commitments (solid line). The preferences and parameters used in
constructing figure are the same as those used in column 4 of Table II; in particular the
consumer has initial wealth of $300,000. The probability of the bad state is p  0.1.